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Abstract. In this note we present a method to construct primes p that satisfy the requirements of the recently
proposed Digital Signature Standard, but for which the discrete logarithm problem in F can be expected to be
easier than for general primes.
Constructing trapdoor primes for the proposed DSS
Recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a proposal
for a Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [6]. In this proposed standard a Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) is specified that would allow users to digitally sign data in such a way
that unauthorized modifications to the data can be detected, and such that the identity
of the signer of the data can be authenticated. For this purpose each signer has a public
key consisting of four integers p, q, g and y, and a private key x that satisfy the following
conditions:
(i) p is a prime with 2511 <p < 2512;
(ii) q is a prime divisor of p — 1 with 2’ < q < 2160;
(iii) g is an element of order q in the field F of p elements;
(iv) x is an integer with 0 <x <q;
(iv) y gX mod
How the proposed DSA works is irrelevant for this note. It suffices to know that if a user’s
private key x can be derived from the corresponding public key p, q, g, y, then signatures
and data originating from this user can be compromised.
Consequently, the security of the proposed DSA relies, among others, on the assump
tion that deriving x from p, q, g, and y is computationally infeasible. One way of finding
x would be to solve the discrete logarithm problem in a subgroup of order q of F; that is
generated by g. It is well known that this can be done in roughly O(/) steps [3]. Another
approach is to solve the discrete logarithm problem in F. There exist various algorithms
for this with expected asymptotic run-time exp((1 + o(1))/logploglogp), for p —* [3].
Neither of these approaches is currently believed to be feasible for the sizes of p (512 bits)
and q (160 bits) in the NIST proposal. The fact that these sizes are fixed, however, makes
the long term security of the proposed DSS questionable. But that is not the point we
want to make in this note.
In [2] a more recent discrete logarithm algorithm is presented that is based on ideas
from the number field sieve factoring algorithm [4] and that runs in expected asymp
totic time exp((c + o(1))(logp)h/3(loglogp)2/3), for some positive constant c and p —* x.
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Asymptotically this is much faster than the algorithms referred to above, but the practical
value of this new algorithm seems to be very limited. There is a variation of this algo
rithm, however, that only applies to primes p of a certain special form, and that runs in
expected asymptotic time exp((1.5 + o(1))(logp)2/5(loglogp)3/S). Although the practical
consequences of this variation are not yet well studied, it is suspected that it will outper
form the above exp((1 + o(1))logploglogp) methods, when applied to the right type of
512-bit primes p, and that such applications might be within our current computational
capabilities. This could seriously undermine the security of the DSS, if 512-bit primes
can be constructed that satisfy the NIST requirements and to which this more practical
variation can be applied. In this note we present a straightforward method to construct
such primes.
Before doing so, we would like to draw a parallel with factoring algorithms. Factoring a
composite integer n is, in general, believed to be a hard problem. There exist various algo
rithms to factor n that have expected asymptotic run-time exp((1 + o(1))/lognloglogn).
We have considerable practical experience with the fastest of these algorithms, the double
large prime variation of the multiple polynomial quadratic sieve. The largest number ever
factored with this algorithm has 116 digits, a computation that took approximately 400
mipsyears;* factoring 512-bit numbers would require approximately 500000 mips-years
using this algorithm. In [4] a more recent algorithm is presented, the number field sieve,
that runs in expected asymptotic time exp((1.53 + o(1))(log )h!3 (log log ri)2!3), but that
can be applied only to numbers ri of a certain special form. For example, the ninth Fermat
number 2512 + 1 has such a special form, and has been factored using the number field
sieve in less than 300 mips-years [5]. Notice that 300 is substantially less than 500000. In
the mean time, a generalized version of the number field sieve has been developed [1]. This
algorithm runs in expected asymptotic time exp((1.92 + o(1))(log n)’I (log logn)2”3), and
can be applied to any composite number n. Its practical value is still under investigation.
The special form that made the 513-bit number F9 = 2512 + 1 susceptible to a fast
number field sieve attack was the fact that F9 divides the polynomial X5+8 when evaluated
at the point X = 2103. More generally, if a 512-bit number has a small multiple that can
be obtained by evaluating a low degree irreducible polynomial with very small integral
coefficients at a certain integer point, then that number can probably be factored with not
much more effort than was spent on the factorization of F9.
With discrete logarithms the situation is similar, but slightly more restricted: we say
that p is ‘nice’ (i.e., has a special form) if there is a low degree irreducible polynomial
* one mips-year is about 3.15 iO’ instructions.
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f(X) e Z[X] with very small coefficients and an integer m, such that p = f(m). If p is
nice, then the discrete logarithm algorithm with expected asymptotic run-time exp((1.5 +
o(1))(logp)2/(loglogp)/ from [2] can be applied top. As mentioned above, the practical
consequences are as yet unknown, but it may be expected to facilitate the discrete logarithm
problem considerably.
We sketch a method to construct nice primes p that also satisfy the NIST requirements
(i) and (ii) mentioned above. There are without any doubt many other ways to do this,
our approach should simply serve as an example to show that such primes are easy to
construct.
Select some fixed polynomial g(X) = g2X + gX + go € Z[X] with coefficients that
are small in absolute value, and a small positive integer h3. This h3 will serve as the
leading coefficient of the polynomial h(X) = h3X + h2X + h1X + h0 € Z[X], whose
other coefficients remain to be determined. Given g and h3, randomly select integers m in
the neighborhood of 2102 . ./3/(gh)until g(rn) is the product of a 160-bit prime q and
some small primes. This can for instance be done by trial dividing g(rn) using the primes
up to a certain bound, after which the remaining cofactor is inspected: if it is a 160-bit
number and probably prime, then a ‘good’ pair g, rn has been found. Given this pair, for
all < B with 0 < i < 2 and some small positive bound B, compute the polynomial
f(X) = g(X) h(X) + 1, and test f(m) for compositeness. If f(m) is a 512-bit prime (and
f(X) is irreducible), then p = f(rn) is an example of a ‘nice’ prime that satisfies the NIST
requirements.
Notice that the search for rn can be carried out efficiently by processing many rn’s (and
various g’s) simultaneously using, for instance, sieving techniques. During our experiments,
all ‘good’ pairs g, rn led to at least one prime p, where we used B = 6. Examples can
thus be constructed fairly rapidly. A theoretical analysis of the speed of our construction
is straightforward. As an example, using g = X2 + 1 and h3 = 3 we found for
m = 536873 26497 82387 49827 39848 65845
the 160-bit prime divisor
q = 137415783141455761863412145223824681515 1177520701
of g(m). Using this pair g, rn we found among (5) others the 512-bit prime
p =13380 74033 83649 981220048787808426958374242296 54826 1221793086
49708 51501 44045 40473 42176 53917 04127 34309 62030 08186 98471 68833
35399 42450 37626 21116 89166 41441 72477,
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which equals 3m5 — 2m4 + 3m — m2 + 2 and for which q divides p — 1.
Similar methods can be used to generate ‘nice’ primes that satisfy irreducible polyno
mials of small degrees other than five. In the above description we used degree five because
that would be close to the optimal degree choice for the number field sieve discrete loga
rithm algorithm applied to primes of 512 bits.
It should be noted that it can fairly easily be detected if a prime is ‘nice’ or not. Our
definition of ‘nice,’ however, can be relaxed somewhat such that ‘nice’ primes are somewhat
harder to recognize, and without affecting their susceptibility to a fast attack. In any case,
the average user of the proposed DSA cannot be expected to be able to inspect the primes
that are used. This poses serious problems for the proposed DSS. A signer cannot use
primes or software provided by a supposedly ‘trusted authority,’ because checking whether
either the primes are ‘nice’ or the software produces ‘nice’ primes is usually beyond his
capabilities. This implies that each signer has to provide his own prime generation code,
which is entirely unrealistic.
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